Banking compliance and the slowness of Justice
Article on banking compliance and the slowness of Justice, addressing the regulatory costs of the financial system since the Basel Committee, Folha de S. Paulo, 2017.
Translated from the original.
The national financial system has been adapting to compliance requirements since the 1970s, above all based on the paradigms of the Basel Committee.
“To comply” means to follow legal and ethical norms, internal and external, with structures endowed with coercive and investigative power. The costs of not following this guideline are increasingly high and of unpredictable impact.
Some examples: damage to the reputation of the organization and of its executives, with short-, medium- and long-term effects; drastic reduction of profits, with loss of competitiveness; cessation of the operation itself; imposition of sanctions on institutions and individuals (administrative, civil and criminal proceedings).
The so-called “compliance function” has relevant characteristics, such as independence, technical dimension, and linkage to management, with powers and guarantees corresponding to its status.
A “sham compliance” or a function stripped of its main characteristics cannot be accepted. Hence the need for permanent review and updating of the institutional profile.
The compliance function exists not only in preventing corruption but, more broadly, in all segments that refer to the internal control system of financial institutions and to business risks, imposing respect for laws and regulations, in order to curb transgressions and avoid risks.
In the banking system, the transversality of compliance must be guaranteed, covering all areas of activity and business risks, from the environmental to the labor area. There is also an interesting common element when speaking of litigiousness – the task of preventing conflict.
One of the challenges of the financial system is, without a doubt, confronting the bottleneck in Justice, to preserve the good image of institutions in their relationship with users of public services or in serving consumers.
Brazil has one of the slowest, most deficit-ridden and overburdened judiciaries in the world, with more than 100 million cases pending. In this context, many disloyal debtors benefit from cases that drag on for years, yet their image deteriorates before society.
In the case of institutions that live off the collective and constantly recycle their reputation with clients, the idea of spontaneous satisfaction of rights is an ethical imperative and a formula for strengthening competitiveness. Just as health is not exclusive to hospitals, justice does not belong exclusively to the courts.
A relevant compliance function allows corporate standards to be adjusted to market-oriented governance, strengthening business and preserving the integrity and credibility of the financial system.
An environment dominated by a robust and up-to-date culture would drive settlements in the courts and curb the rampant litigiousness that has always marked relations between consumers and banks in Brazil.
The example, of course, must come from the public sector. Brazil's largest litigant is the Union, responsible for clogging the Courts.
Public banks, of which the Union is the largest shareholder, should implement a model in which the satisfaction of the rights of consumers and users occurs without conflict.
Moreover, allowing disputes to drag on forever in the Judiciary is an act that offends the dignity of the human person and violates the principle of the reasonable duration of proceedings.
FÁBIO MEDINA OSÓRIO, holder of a doctorate in law from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain), is executive president of the International Institute of State Law Studies. He served as Attorney General of Brazil (Temer government)